Beheading in Basilan, however, is mainly political.
Tactical errors, lapses—these are now commonly used words in the Armed Forces of the Philippines—and they appear to be the
most convenient excuses for the recent setbacks in Sulu and Basilan. (Click here to see the location of Basilan island through Google Maps.) But our findings show that poor planning and tired troops are key factors in the military debacle.
A couple of weeks ago, the AFP blamed the death of 14 Marine soldiers (July 10, 2007) in Basilan to the wrong radio frequency because rescue forces couldn’t get their location. Ten of the 14 were mutilated and beheaded while 15 others were injured. The beheading, Newsbreak learned, was driven by political reasons. The Marines strictly enforced the gun ban before the elections and angered local politicians.
Later, the ambush on August 9 at Maimbung town in Sulu (click here to view location through Google Maps), wherein 10 Army soldiers were killed, was attributed to the failure to provide back-up security escorts. In a matter of days, casualties increased to a total of 27 soldiers killed and 12 wounded.
Armed Forces chief of staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon Jr and Western Mindanao Command chief Lt. General Eugenio Cedo agree that tactical errors are the reasons for the heavy casualties of the military in these two provinces of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
However, an Army colonel and a junior officer we talked to expressed dismay over the outcome of multi-million pesos worth of military operations. They blame the main planners and recommend stripping them of their star ranks. "The high error percentage is unacceptable given that this caused the lives of 42 soldiers in a span of 30 days," the Army officer said.
Both of our sources requested not to be identified because they are not authorized to speak on the issue.
The junior officer, with the rank of lieutenant, says military planners are likened to licensed engineers: "They conceive first the idea, then plan and map all factors such as safety, zoning of areas, logistics, supplies and resources, workers, funding and then construction. Once a mild crack is noticed on a structure, engineers may face serious consequences. This is investigated and if the engineers are found to have been reckless, their licenses are cancelled."
Unfortunately these procedures don't apply to the main planners of the AFP, the young lieutenant lamented.
Tactical Blunder
In 2005, the Panamao attack—where the military operation against the ASG dragged on for about 10 days—resulted in the death of about 40 soldiers and an officer, Colonel Dennis Villanueva.
However, according to an intelligence officer, "the margin of error in 2005 is quite acceptable because the operation lasted more than a week. But the error committed in the recent operation wherein 27 are dead within 10 hours is unimaginable. It's basically a tactical blunder."
The AFP has seen better days. In 2003, for example, soldiers captured Abu Sayyaf leaders Mujib Susukan and Galib Andang aka Kumander Robot in Sulu. A resident, Fatmawati Salapuddin, remembers it well: "It was very laudable as the AFP then conducted the operation quietly, they didn't employ thousands of troops and they didn't use high-powered artilleries and bombs and no one was displaced."
In Basilan last year, the military launched successful operations against the Abu Sayyaf, making them flee to the nearby island of Sulu.
Today, the AFP has sent more than 6,000 troops to pursue less then 500 armed elements in Sulu and Basilan.
Tired Troops
Weeks without rest are taking their toll on the soldiers.
Wilfreda Potoy, mother of slain Private First Class Rico Potoy, gunner of Bravo Company of the 33rd Infantry Battalion, received a text message from her eldest son on August 8, 2007 saying he's exhausted from their operation.
“Father, mother I am going home on August 12. I am very tired. Almost everyday, there's operation, morning, at night. We keep on operating 10 days straight, I want to rest," Rico said in his message.
Rico Potoy was among the 16 killed in an encounter on August 9 in Maimbung.
Wilfreda's youngest son, Private Astor "Jojo" Potoy Jr, also of 33rd IB confirmed that their unit operated without rest since the first of August.
Total battle casualties incurred in the August 8 and 9 encounters were 2. Twelve others were wounded of whom three are in critical condition.
Task Force Comet chief Maj. Gen. Reuben Rafael told Newsbreak that their enemies, combined Abu Sayyaf and "rogue" Moro National Liberation Front fighters, incurred 37 killed in action but only 10 bodies were recovered. Of the 10, only four were identified.
Widow Sara Hashim wife of slain Private First Class Daim Hashim, native of Jolo, told Newsbreak that her husband was a non-combatant. Sara, speaking in Filipino said, "My husband worked as carpenter of the 33rd Infantry Battalion, part of the non-operating troops.”
Hashim’s best friend, Private First Class Kaisar Hassan, who was also killed, was sort of an all-around personnel at the battalion, cleaning bunkers, weeding grasses, preparing coffee.
“They lacked people as everyone was in the operation,” Sara said.
How it Started
As early as August 2, Sulu Gov. Abdusakur Tan reported that several families were displaced in Indanan town due to renewed military campaign against the Abu Sayyaf Group. But the military kept mum about this.
Indanan field social worker Christopher Lee confirmed that on August 2, several residents scampered for safety seeing the arrival of soldiers "who later established positions in the communities, thus residents abandoned their houses for fear of being caught in the crossfire."
On August 7, two junior officers of the Marine Battalion Landing Team 11 were wounded in an Indanan clash. Still, officials of the Western Mindanao Command kept silent.
A day later, Comet chief Rafael confirmed the report in Indanan including the wounding of five others from the 33rd Infantry Battalion. One was killed, identified as Private First Class Stevencent Ballares.
"The Army troopers clashed with about 50 heavily armed Abu Sayyaf Group. We have recovered four dead from the Abu Sayyaf side," Rafael said.
However, Hatimil Hasan, interim vice chair of the MNLF sounded the alarm over the incident: “There are no members or leaders of the Abu Sayyaf killed, all those slain were bonafide members and commander of the MNLF Parang Municipal Command." Hasan identified the slain commander as Jeili Habbi, chair of MNLF Parang. A son and two other close-in security, all MNLF fighters, were killed.
MNLF Coddling Abu Sayyaf?
Apparently, the military suspects the MNLF of harboring ASG members.
Ustadz Habib Zain Jali, MNLF spiritual adviser, said he was informed by fighters on the ground that Habbi, the slain MNLF chair who is more than 60 years old, was roused from sleep early dawn, went out to inspect the surrounding, "along with his son and two others and as he opened the gate, a burst of fire greeted him."
"We lost seven comrades,” said Hasan, who is also concurrent speaker of the Legislative Assembly of the ARMM.
He revealed that prior to the August 8 attack, "soldiers in three truckloads encircled camp of Ustadz Khaid (Adjibun)," chair of the MNLF State Revolutionary Command based in Indanan.
Two wounded Army soldiers of the 33rd Infantry Battalion corroborated Hassan’s statements.
Private First Class Muhamil Hassan (not related to Hatimil Hasan) of the lead squad unit said that on the dawn of August 7, they were informed by their commander to execute a highly sensitive mission in Parang, Sulu. They jumped off before five o’clock in the morning of August 8 to the said area and Hassan was directed to lead an advance unit.
"Our mission was to go after Albader Parad and Doktor Abu (who are Abu Sayyaf) but when we arrived, it was the MNLF," Hassan said but quickly added that "the Abu Sayyaf and MNLF may have combined forces because that’s what’s been talked about."
Private First Class Abdulhari Bittong, a native of Parang, admits he was briefed about the mission but was unaware of the objective.
Bittong said that when they reached their destination, "I was surprised because it was the house of MNLF Commander Jeili. The rebels were in ambush position, then there was an exchange of gunfire, at close range. We were about 20 meters from the rebels, that’s why I know who we were fighting against."
When Bittong asked why he knew some of his targets and the slain commander, he said that he used to be with them since he is an integree, one of the former MNLF fighters who joined the AFP.
Commander Jeili is known in the community and maintained several fighters.
MNLF Not Demobilized
"The military violated the peace agreement,” Hassan said. “They attacked camps of the MNLF in Indanan and Parang and it's our right to defend our territory."
Hasan confirmed that the Bangsamoro Army was responsible for the August 9 ambush on government troops in Maimbung initially resulting in 10 killed and one wounded.
"We can’t accept that we are being attacked by the AFP, we don’t know what their objective is," Adjibun said after a series of dialogues initiated by the AFP and MNLF ground commanders.
From August 2 to 6, troops of Task Group Philippine Marine Corps along with Joint Special Operations Force encircled Indanan forcing the MNLF to abandon their last and recognized territory.
On August 8, 2007 elements of 33rd Infantry Battalion raided the house of MNLF Parang Chair Jeili Habbi. Habbi and three other MNLF fighters were killed.
Before that, MNLF commander Ustadz Habier Malik declared jihad on April 13 against the Armed Forces when he got confirmation that troops of Joint Special Operations under Col. Ruperto Pabustan were responsible for the death of a teenager on February 19, 2007 in Indanan.
The teenager turned out to be the grandson of an MNLF commander who was killed in a declared "free fire zone" area of Indanan.
However, Pabustan insisted the boy was an Abu Sayyaf: "Why on earth was he there late that night if he is not a bandit. He was killed in a legitimate encounter."
But a probe conducted by the Commission on Human Rights showed that the boy was with another male companion on their way home after watching a TV soap opera.
In late April, 2nd Marine Brigade commander Col. Ceasario Atienza took control of Camp Jabal Uhod of the MNLF in Panamao.
Basilan: Marines vs Politicians
In Basilan, it’s different. Some link the Sulu tragedy to Basilan's carnage but reasons for the clashes differ.
While the MILF admitted they ambused the Marines in July—who were then searching for the kidnapped Italian priest—they said that they did not behead the soldiers.
The reasons for the beheading of the Marines are mainly political. An independent investigation by a group of foreign and Filipino women organized by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict-Southeast Asia (GPPAC-SEA) and the Mindanao Peace Weavers (MPW) showed that “issues related to politics are among the factors that contributed to the deterioration of peace and security in the island province."
Newsbreak learned that the beleaguered unit of the Philippine Marines during the July 10 incident in Albarka town earned a reputation as the most stringent unit when it comes to gun ban enforcement.
The slain soldiers were actively involved in enforcing the firearm ban, according to Lt. Col. Felix Almadrones who heads the Marine unit deployed to confiscate loose firearms.
The Marines started to implement the gun ban in April, as mandated by the Commission on Elections, in the run up to the May 14 election.
The Marines reported that assorted firearms were apprehended from politicians but identities were not indicated. In April and May, the unit confiscated several firearms and rounds of ammunition reportedly owned by politicians in the area.
In July 5, the unit encountered suspected members of the Abu Sayyaf Group and recovered one more firearm.
No Sacred Cows
Local officials attest to the dedication and determination of the Marine Battalion Landing Team 8 (MBLT8), headed by Almadrones, in trying to clean the province of loose firearms that have been the cause of lawlessness and banditry for a long time.
Lamitan City Mayor Roderick Furigay said the sincerity of the said unit is indisputable. “They didn’t have sacred cows. If anyone violated the law, whoever he or she was, they were treated equally."
Basilan Bishop Martin Jumoad said that "they were very faithful to their work, they were just following orders and doing their mission and were known as uncompromising against illegal activities."
Jumoad said the unit was firm in their campaign against loose firearms. “They arrested and seized guns even if they belonged to the followers of influential politicians like Gerry Salapuddin or Wahab Akbar."
Naval Forces Western Mindanao Command chief Rear Admiral Emilio Marayag said that "our soldiers in Basilan were able to apprehend more firearms in just a span of four months in the area compared to other units that have been assigned to this island for more than three years."
Party-list Rep. Mujiv Hataman (Anak-Mindanao) confirmed that Almadrones’ unit "was very rigid in performing their mission they were not afraid to disarm politicians or followers of politicians before and after the election."
Trace the Root Cause
Hataman believes that the root cause of the conflict "boils to one thing, the proliferation of loose firearms. The government's efforts to address this and personnel engaging in this campaign always end up in tragic incidents, relieved or demoted."
In 2001, Army personnel of 103rd Army Brigade also implemented the gun ban campaign. Hataman recalled that more firearms were recovered inside the Provincial Capitol Office when the governor was Wahab Akbar, now a congressman, and the Army official then was Col. Jovenal Narcise.
"Other than growing animosity, there was legal battle between the governor and the army official," Hataman said but the difference was, "Narcise didn't coordinate with his higher official while the Marines had prior coordination and they properly turned over the apprehended firearms to their higher officials."
"It's like rido (vengeance) against uniformed personnel, where armed groups tried to avenge their losses," Hataman said.
Rear Admiral Marayag suggested that the "Commission on Audit should conduct a probe on politicians like Akbar. He should explain how he was able to acquire firearms: are they government firearms or does he buy them using his own money?"
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